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CAMPAIGNING IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE:
THE REGULATION OF POLITICAL
BROADCASTING DURING THE 1980
ELECTIONS
By Stuart N. Brotman*
INTRODUCTION
The electronic media and political campaigns, for better or worse,
have become more inextricably tied to each other with each successive
campaign year.' A not surprising corollary of this phenomenon has
been the increase in regulatory problems surrounding broadcasts of
campaign activities. The recently completed campaign season gener-
ated at least four important issues in political broadcasting that reach
out for long-term solutions by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC), the Congress, and/or the courts: (1) the appropriate cir-
cumstances for airing debates between or among candidates for all
levels of office; (2) the point at which a candidate is considered to be
"legally qualified" by the FCC so as to trigger the "equal opportuni-
ties" provision of section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934;2
(3) whether a station or network acts unreasonably in refusing to sell
air time to Presidential candidates several months before the first state
primary; and (4) whether public broadcasting stations should be ex-
empted from the requirement to provide reasonable access to Federal
candidates under section 312(a)(7) of the Act.3 These issues, and some
suggested remedial measures, will be the focus of this article.
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2. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
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I. SECTION 315(A): AN OVERVIEW
Section 315(a) of the Communications Act requires radio and tele-
vision stations to afford precisey equal opportunities to all "legally
qualified candidates" (a term of art discussed below) for elective office,
if any one candidate is permitted a "use" of the station. Any "use" of
broadcast facilities, however slight, triggers the equal opportunities
provision. Thus, if a candidate's voice or image appears in a readily
identifiable manner, even if only for a brief period, a "use" has oc-
curred and equal time must be given.4
The equal opportunities provision covers all programming, includ-
ing commercials, except that which comes under one of the four ex-
empt categories of the law: (1) a bona fide newscast; (2) a bona fide
news interview; (3) a bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of
the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or sub-
jects); and (4) on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event.5 Any
program in one of these categories does not trigger an equal opportuni-
ties obligation; rather, the station must only ensure that if controversial
issues of public importance are raised therein, it will present contrast-
ing viewpoints on them.
Section 315(a) is applicable to state and local, as well as Federal
elections. Its equal opportunities provision comprises both the equal
free use of air time (commonly known as "equal time") and the right to
purchase air time at ratds and times comparable to those offered to
other candidates for the same office.6
Enacted by Congress in 1959, section 315(a) encompasses two leg-
islative objectives. The first aims to provide the public with maximum
exposure to the views of all candidates, consistent with the mandate of
the First Amendment to promote wide-open debate and preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately pre-
vail.7 The second objective is to encourage fairness in the political pro-
cess by requiring broadcasters to afford equal opportunities to those
seeking the same office.
In practice, however, these objectives tend to contradict each
4. See, e.g., Harry M. Plotkin, 23 F.C.C. 2d 758 (1970); cf. National Urban Coalition,
23 F.C.C. 2d 123 (1970) (incidental appearance of future gubernatorial candidate in which
he was not "readily identifiable" did not constitute a "use" under section 315(a)).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976).
6. Id.
7. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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other. Insuring equal opportunities for all candidates often has re-
sulted in a station's decision not to give free time for presentations by
the major candidates where there are a number of minority party can-
didates who, under the law, would have a mandatory right of equal
time. Since the equal opportunities provision can be triggered by a sin-
gle broadcast, the presence of a multiplicity of candidates for a single
office (there were, for example, at least a dozen legally qualified candi-
dates for President last year), acts as a disincentive for the broadcaster.
Under such circumstances, free time requirements can become uncon-
trolled, and revenue-producing broadcast schedules must be rear-
ranged to comply with the equal opportunities requirement. The
practical result, consequently, has been to keep candidate air time to a
minimum, and thus limit the electorate's exposure to the candidates.
This is substantiated by data gathered in the 1960 election, when
Congress exempted, on a one-time only basis, the Presidential and Vice
Presidential races from the equal opportunities provision. John Ken-
nedy and Richard Nixon, the beneficiaries of this action, received al-
most forty hours of free time donated by the networks. By contrast, in
1964, when the provision was again in force, Lyndon Johnson and
Barry Goldwater received less than five hours of donated time.8
II. CAMPAIGN DEBATES
Perhaps the most direct forum for discussing the issues, and for
highlighting for prospective voters the philosophical differences and
personal styles between competing candidates, is a political debate be-
tween candidates. This became readily apparent, for example, in last
year's Presidential election; the televised debate between Jimmy Carter
and Ronald Reagan in Cleveland, one week before ballots were cast,
may have marked a distinctive shift in support toward the Republican
challenger, who was perceived as the "winner" by most public opinion
surveys.9 But until 1975, when the FCC issued a special ruling in re-
sponse to a petition submitted by the Aspen Institute's Program on
Communications and Society, 10 broadcast debates were not considered
under the exempt category of Section 315(a), which provides for on-
the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event. Accordingly, until this
8. MACNEIL, supra note 1, at 285-86.
9. Isaacson, Now, a Few Words in Closing, Reagan benefts/rom the Big Debate, TIME,
Nov. 10, 1980, at 18.
10. Seegenerall Aspen Inst. Program on Communications and Soc'y, 55 F.C.C. 2d 697
(1975). ajfdsub nom. Chisholm v. F.C.C., 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 429
U.S. 890 (1976).
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decision was released, broadcasters would not present them because of
the equal time problem they created. This 1975 case, commonly known
as the Aspen ruling, overturned prior FCC decisions by characterizing
certain debates as falling within the bona fide news event exemption. It
greatly reduced the inhibitory effect of equal time felt by broadcasters.
On the national level, the Aspen ruling led to the three broadcast de-
bates in 1976 between Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford and the single
broadcast debate between Walter Mondale and Robert Dole, all staged
by the League of Women Voters.' Subsequently, it has allowed de-
bates at the state and local level and at the primary election level, and
in 1980, generated the Anderson-Reagan and Carter-Reagan debates,
TheAspen ruling, however, is limited to debates that are produced
by nonbroadcast entities in non-studio settings. Thus, in 1976, the
League of Women Voters [the League] selected the dates and the non-
studio locations, such as the Palace of Fine Arts in San Francisco, the
format, and the panelists who questioned the candidates. This year,
again, the League determined the eligibility of participants and selected
the formats, panelists, and remote locations in Baltimore and Cleve-
land for the two broadcast debates. Although the three television net-
works have participated to some extent in the planning of the debates,
the League has clearly controlled the process in order to comply with
the limitation of the Aspen ruling. The role of the networks has been
reduced primarily to remote production and transmission; their ability
to exercise broadcast jourhialism, in effect, has been preempted by the
FCC ruling.
While the airing of the debates is a salutory accomplishment, their
infrequent staging, particularly at the state and local levels, suggests
that the Aspen ruling is, at best, a stop-gap measure until legislative
revision, or perhaps a more refined interpretation by the FCC, takes
place. Thus far, the Aspen ruling has been applied only to debates anfi
press conferences held by candidates, but this limitation seems difficult
to sustain. Other programming formats, such as a series of programs
featuring candidates discussing the "great issues" of a campaign may
be equally effective in informing the electorate. Under present law,
however, a broadcaster could not block out time for such programming
without triggering the equal time requirement. This is an especially
acute problem at the state and local levels, where there are frequently a
multiplicity of candidates for various offices. As noted, a broadcaster
under these circumstances is not likely to plan such an informational
II. See generall, S. KRAUS, THE GREAT DEBATES, CARTER V. FORD, 1976 (1979).
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series, since a "floodgate" could be created when all the other candi-
dates exercised their right to mandatory equal time.
The FCC or Congress should revisit the Aspen ruling to permit a
broadcaster to exercise bona fide news judgment by covering any ap-
pearance of a candidate in any primary or general election campaign.
Such an interpretation would eliminate the artificial line that existing
law establishes for debates; that is, the requirement that they be pro-
duced by nonbroadcast entities in non-studio settings. At the least, this
current limitation strains the resources of nonbroadcast groups, who
are forced to expend considerable energies and significant portions of
their budgets to develop broadcasting expertise. Even on the national
level, there is no assurance that groups such as the League of Women
Voters will be able to financially sustain Presidential debates in the fu-
ture. t2 Moreover, radio and television stations already have production
expertise, studios, and journalists who are familiar with the candidates.
This efficiency rationale is even more urgent in state and local situa-
tions, where nonbroadcast entities may be unwilling or unable to as-
sume the substantial responsibility of producing a series of media
debates.
With a justifiably broad reading of the bona fide news event ex-
emption, limited only by the requirements that the programming ex-
plores conflicting views on current issues of public importance and that
it is not designed to serve the political advantage of any legally-quali-
fied candidate, broadcasters could then sponsor debates at all levels of
office. For the first time, broadcasters could allow candidates to appear
on journalistic programs like "The Advocates" without triggering equal
time-not to advance their' candidacies, but to discuss important topi-
cal issues. 13
Such revision, of course, should not preclude nonbroadcast groups
from producing or sponsoring broadcast debates; rather, broadcasters
should be allowed to participate actively in debates if they can act as
12, For example, during the recent presidential election campaign, the League of Wo-
men Voters indicated that it was having problems raising money to support a series of
broadcast debates. See Clines, Lack of Funds May Block Presidental TV Debates, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 24, 1979; § A, at 16, col. 1.
13. During 1980, "The Advocates," a series produced by WGBH, Boston and distrib-
uted nationally through PBS, presented several shows during the closing months of the cam-
paign that dealt with discussions of important domestic and international issues that were
central to the presidential election. Ironically, because of the current construction of the
equal time rule, no candidate appeared on these programs to discuss these issues with an
opposing candidate. Rather, ideological surrogates appeared, despite the fact that none
could communicate the real position of the candidates they represented as well as the candi-
dates themselves.
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the better catalyst under the circumstances.' 4 The end result should be
an increase in overall air time for candidates to discuss the issues, and
the greater utilization of debates and similar innovative programming
formats during political campaigns.
III. THE "LEGALLY QUALIFIED" CANDIDATE
The application of section 315(a) is premised upon the use of air
time by a "legally qualified" candidate. Under FCC rules, such a can-
didate is anyone who has publicly announced his or her intention to
run for nomination or election; is qualified under the applicable local,
state or Federal law to hold the office for which he or she is a candi-
date; or has made a substantial showing of bona fide candidacy.' 5 This
showing means evidence that the person claiming to be a candidate has
engaged to a substantial degree in activities commonly associated with
political campaigning. The FCC has said that these activities normally
would include making campaign speeches, distributing campaign liter-
ature, issuing press releases, maintaining a campaign committee, and
establishing campaign headquaters, even if it is also the residence of
the candidate or campaign manager. 6 It has also said that this list is
not exhaustive, nor are all the listed activities necessarily required in
each case to demonstrate a substantial showing.' 7
The reality of today's politics, especially the Presidential cam-
paign, is that it has developed into somewhat of a marathon.' 8 Jimmy
Carter, for example, began actively campaigning a full year before the
New Hampshire primary in 1976, and in his own mind, at least, was
engaged in a substantial showing of bona fide candidacy. The same
can be said for candidates such as George' Bush, whose unsuccessful
quest for the Republican nomination for President began in early 1978.
The question raised by these long-term campaign sagas is whether the
candidate's activities coincide with the FCC's interpretation of the "le-
gally qualified candidate" requirement, and if not, whether this inter-
pretation should be modified in conformance with new political
realties.
14. Although it would be awkward to draft legislative language that indicates a neutral
policy toward sponsorship of broadcast debates by nonbroadcast groups, such an idea could
adequately be articulated in legislative history prepared to accompany any amendment to
section 315(a).
15. See 47 C.F.R. § 94(a) (1978).
16. Id. at 94(a)(5).
17. Id.
18. See generally J. WITCOVER, MARATHON: THE PURSUIT OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1972-
76 (1977).
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Last year, the FCC was forced to focus on the problem of still
another marathon candidate, Ronald Reagan. In the early summer of
1979, five months before he issued a specific announcement of his can-
didacy for President, the National Citizens Committee for Broadcast-
ing [NCCB] asked the FCC to issue a declaratory ruling finding Mr.
Reagan to be a "legally qualified candidate." With such a FCC ruling,
any station airing Mr. Reagan's daily radio commentary, syndicated
nationwide, would have been obligated to offer equal time to the ten
other Republican contenders seeking the party's nomination. The re-
sult of such a ruling, in practical terms, would have forced these sta-
tions to withdraw Mr. Reagan's commentary at that time.
NCCB felt these broadcasts, if not covered by the equal time re-
quirement, would provide Reagan with "extremely valuable extensive
public exposure" at the expense of the other candidates.' 9 It alleged
that Mr. Reagan intended to seek the Republican nomination, and sup-
ported this charge with these assertions: (1) Senator Laxalt, the Reagan
campaign director in 1976, acknowledged on CBS' "Face the Nation"
that Mr. Reagan had decided to seek the nomination; (2) Mr. Reagan
consented to Senator Laxalt's chairing of a "Reagan for President"
committee in March, 1979; (3) the Reagan for President Committee
filed a Statement of Organization with the Federal Election Commis-
sion that same month; and (4) Mr. Reagan had failed to respond to a
notice of the Federal Election Commission in March, 1979, informing
him that he would be deemed to be a candidate under Federal election
law in the event that he failed to disavow his candidacy within 30
days.20
Despite this, the FCC rejected the claim, saying that the factors
cited by NCCB "do not constitute evidence relevant to making a sub-
stantial showing in any specific state,"'" and that Mr. Reagan had not
yet qualified for the Presidential primary in any state.22 It stated that
the existing rule "reflects the peculiar nature of our nominating proce-
dures, provides reasonable standards, and strikes a balance between a
rigid and possibly unfair definition of a legally qualified candidate for
President and a wide-open definition which could only lead to more
uncertainty and not serve the public interest.
' '23
This case highlighted a dilemma of equity. Declaring someone a
19. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 46 RAD. REG. (P&F) 2d 1, 3 (1979).
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 8.
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"legally qualified candidate" on a largely unilateral basis could be un-
fair to someone like Mr. Reagan, whose livelihood was in part depen-
dent on his radio commentaries. On the other hand, it may be unfair to
the other candidates to allow Mr. Reagan to espouse his campaign po-
sitions, in a format he controls, that is exempt from the equal time re-
quirement.
The FCC, could, in the future, strike a better balance by involving
the putative candidate in the process of determining his or her status.
This could be accomplished by a system whereby a complainant would
initially have the burden of producing serious evidence that the candi-
date was "legally qualified." If this showing included a finding by an-
other government body, acting under state or Federal law, then the
presumption should arise that the candidate is "legally qualified." In
other cases, the FCC should retain discretion, reviewable by the courts
on an expedited basis, to determine whether the allegations justify the
presumption. In any event, the presumption should be rebuttable; that
is, the "candidate" should be given an opportunity to refute the charges
and claim non-candidate status for a period of time. The candidate,
then, will have significant input into the determination, and will be able
to weigh the benefits and detriments to a candidacy by accepting a tem-
porary, non-candidate status. The FCC, in rejecting NCCB's request
for a declaratory ruling, should have at least commenced a rulemaking
to establish standards that are more in touch with the extended nature
of recent campaigns. By not doing so, it has merely postponed the reso-
lution of a problem that may well arise again in the future.
IV. "REASONABLE ACCESS" FOR FEDERAL CANDIDATES
Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act gives the FCC au-
thority to revoke a broadcast license if the licensee willfully or repeat-
edly fails to allow reasonable access or to permit the purchase of
reasonable amounts of time for the use of a radio or television station
by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office.2"
In October, 1979, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee,
Inc. filed a complaint against the three television networks with the
FCC. The Committee charged that CBS, NBC, and ABC had violated
the reasonable access provision by refusing to sell it time to air a thirty-
minute prime time program that would be used for an appearance by
the President after he declared his candidacy. NBC and ABC had re-
fused because they felt it was "too early to begin a presidential cam-
24. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
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paign." CBS claimed that the program would involve "massive
disruptions" of its regular schedule, offering instead to sell a five-min-
ute slot at 10:55 p.m. and another in the daytime. The networks also
expressed the apprehension that selling the time to the Committee
would set a precedent that could be demanded by other candidates. All
three claimed that the refusal to sell the requested time could not be
found to be an abuse of discretion.
The FCC decided in favor of the Committee, and ordered the net-
works to detail how they intended to fulfill their reasonable access obli-
gations.2" This decision was subsequently affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.26 One
unresolved issue in this controversy, however, remains-the interplay
between the "legally qualified" candidate and the "reasonable access"
provisions. As defacto candidacies arise many months before the start
of the formal aspects of the campaign, it seems that some objective
standards are necessary to evaluate when the campaign has begun.
Under the record of current decision, for example, it is possible that a
candidate could be found outside the confines of equal time while de-
manding, with FCC support, reasonable access under section 312(a)(7).
This fact pattern did not arise in the Carter-Mondale situation, since
the President would have been subject to the equal time restriction
when reasonable access was given. But what would the FCC do in
such a case? Here, again, is a matter sure to arise in the future that has
not yet been properly addressed.
Additionally, the FCC's standards should be improved in the "rea-
sonable access" as well as the "legally qualified candidate" area. As in
the latter area, it would be helpful to provide illustrative examples of
what the FCC would consider as "reasonable." It is not sufficient to
say that all matters must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The fairness
doctrine, for example, is administered case-by-case, yet the FCC has at
least attempted to set forth examples that can provide some measure of
guidance to broadcasters.27 By setting the boundaries of a zone of rea-
sonableness, broadcasters would be provided with better notice in this
25. See Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm. 74 F.C.C. 2d 657 (1979). a f'g Carter-
Mondale Presidential Comm., 74 F.C.C. 2d 631 (1979).
26. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 629 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1980): The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari, 101 S.Ct. 353 (1980), and the author hopes the Court will deal with the serious
definitional problems that have occurred in the FCC's administration of this area, a matter
that is beyond the intended scope of this article.
27. See, e.g., Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1974), reconsidered, 58 F.C.C. 2d 691
(1976), rev'd in part, National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC. 567 F.2d 1095
(D.C. Cir., 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
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sensitive First Amendment area,28 while the FCC would be providing
other participants in the campaign calculus with a more defined frame-
work for decisionmaking.
V. MANDATORY ACCESS AND PUBLIC BROADCASTING
Section 312(a)(7) currently applies to all broadcast stations, both
commercial and noncommercial.29 Although it might be argued that
such coverage is equitable because it treats all stations alike, this rea-
soning fails to recognize the significant structural and functional attrib-
utes of public broadcasting. The silence of the legislative history
surrounding this provision has created an ambiguity as to whether, in
Commissioner Fogarty's words, it places "an onerous burden on public
broadcasting .... -30 The FCC, however, has interpreted the section
as inclusive of public broadcasting, much as the equal opportunities
provision of section 315(a) is applied to all broadcasters. There is,
however, a critical difference between the access obligations of these
two sections. Section 315(a) creates a contingent access obligation, so
that no broadcaster becomes obligated to offer paid or free air time
unless he allows a legally qualified candidate to use his facilities. By
contrast, section 312(a)(7) is a mandatory access obligation for any can-
didate seeking Federal elective office who wishes to buy or obtain free
air time. It is here that a meaningful distinction should come into play.
Unlike their commercial counterparts, public broadcasters are not
allowed to charge for the use of air time. Rather, all required access
must be given away in the form of time blocks in the regular program
schedule. In heavily populated television markets, such as New York
and Los Angeles, this situation can lead to substantial demand for free
time on public stations because there may be literally hundreds of can-
didates seeking congressional seats. Thus, the mandatory access re-
quirement applied to public broadcasters produces at least two negative
consequences. First, there are the financial and management costs that
must be devoted to handling access requests. The commercial broad-
caster can offset costs by charging the Federal candidate for air time;
28. The Supreme Court has traditionally been wary of vague application of administra-
tive rules. See, e.g., FCC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 726 (1948); Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1969). Moreover, it has been particularly sensitive in *he area of
free expression, since vagueness may create uncertainty and "the danger that the legitimate
utterance will be penalized." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). See generally
Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
29. See Public Broadcasting Council of Central New York, 38 RAD. REG. (P&F) 2d
1255 (1976).
30. Labor Party v. WNET, 42 RAD. REG. (P&F) 2d 307, 310 (1978).
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the public broadcaster cannot. Additionally, because there is no com-
mercial check on requests for access time for noncommercial stations,
the access requests can potentially create a severe disruption in sched-
uled programming, and interfere with the overall statutory mandate
that requires public broadcasters to serve a broad range of social, eco-
nomic, and educational needs. 31 A change in the language of the sec-
tion, accompanied by legislative history that articulates why public
broadcasting should receive differing treatment for mandatory access,
would represent a significant step. ConCurrently, however, Congress
should make clear in statutory language and legislative history that
both the equal opportunities provision of section 315 and its more gen-
eralized fairness doctrine (which requires that broadcasters provide
contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance, in-
cluding those raised by candidates during the campaign) remain in
force for all broadcast stations. This is called for because the rationale
for differing treatment does not apply in these areas.32
CONCLUSION
The issues discussed in this article suggest, both individually and
collectively, that the interdependence of politics and the electronic me-
dia does not by itself create consensus regarding how regulation of the
two is conceived or implemented, nor does it produce easy answers.
Regulation of political broadcasting must not only be in harmony with
legal precedents; it must also be attuned and willing to develop along
with our constantly evolving electoral process. Appropriate policymak-
ers, and the courts if necessary, should now reevaluate the efficiency
and clarity of the existing framework governing political campaign
coverage by the electronic media. Further, revisions should be made
that better balance the equities between candidates and broadcasters,
with the goal of producing a more informed electorate always in focus
as a guiding principle.
31. See 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1976).
32. A bill that would have accomplished this, S. 3079, was introduced by Senator Tal-
madge in September, 1980. It failed, however, to be voted out by the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation in the 96th Congress, 2d. session.
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